Model ingredients
• time is discrete, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
• i.i.d. random variable with realizations z t ∈ Z = {z L , z H }
• measure one of identical consumers
• measure one of identical banks
• each period there is a market for labor, wage w
• each period there is a market for non-contingent bonds, price q
Consumers
• consumers are risk-neutral, value consumption, discount factor β ∈ (0, 1)
• supply one unit of labor inelastically each period
• can trade non-contingent bonds
Banks
• banks are risk neutral, value dividends d ≥ 0, discount factor γ ∈ (0, β)
• can trade non-contingent bond, hold quantity b ∈ R
• have access to risky projects:
can invest k t+1 in period t to receive R t+1 (z t+1 )k t+1 in period t + 1
• bank can misappropriate fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of investment at end of period, but would lose bank capital and rents
• market discipline: bank can issue non-contingent bonds if it has incentive not to misappropriate
Competitive equilibrium
• a bank project generates cash flow zk α l 1−α + (1 − δ)k − wl, where l denotes labor hired for a project, δ ∈ (0, 1) is depreciation rate
• let K denote aggregate bank investment (loans to projects), L = 1 aggregate labor
• in a competitive equilibrium:
-wage is given by w t = z t (1 − α)K α t -return on bank lending is given by R t = z t αK α−1 t
Market-imposed capital requirements
• define bank capital as common equity plus retained earnings:
• define bank future rents:
-first term denotes profits from lending -second term denotes benefit from using external finance b t+τ < 0
• condition for market discipline can be expressed as
• market-imposed capital requirement is given by
-it is lower during crises: negative shock to capital lowers lending and increases margins (R ↑ implies Π ↑)
• market-imposed capital requirements bind only occasionally -because banks risk-weight income from lending: return on capital high when aggregate capital low ('last-bank-standing' effect)
• is bank risk management induced by market discipline sufficient? would 'macro-prudential' regulation require more or less loan loss provisioning?
Optimal capital requirements
• market-imposed capital requirements depend on future lending returns via Π
• introduces a pecuniary externality (in the sense of Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1986) • constrained social planner can improve upon individual bank risk management
• assume planner maximizes expected present value of dividends and wages, common discount factor β (bank pays dividends to consumers, run by impatient banker)
Numerical analysis
• compare competitive equilibrium to constrained-efficient allocation -identify tools which can implement constrained-efficient allocation -interpret those as necessary macro-prudential tools
• parameters: • shows lower bound that market imposes on capital-asset ratio
• capital relief in large crisis for SB: planner promises higher rents to banks, lowers market-imposed capital requirement • reduces amplification, mitigates large crises • the line M shows realized margin
• note that corr(M, EM) < 0 in the model, see also Santos-Winton (2008) • market-imposed capital requirement is counter-cyclical in CE (and in SB): market allows for higher leverage if future margins higher (when rents Π positive)
What did we learn about optimal macro-prudential regulation?
• banks should be allowed to have higher leverage during severe crises: capital relief -supported by higher future rents to satisfy market imposed capital requirements -rents decrease gradually over time following a severe crisis: persistence in rents lowers overall distortion, but also slows down recovery
• avoid relying too much on rents: additional capital buffer -buffer is 'always on' in good times: do not wait until one bad shock occurs in order to turn it on due to non-linearities
Conclusion
• study competitive equilibrium in an economy with market-imposed capital requirements
• also study constrained-efficient allocation in such an economy
• interpret difference in bank capital between the two as due to macro-prudential concerns
• identify two macro-prudential tools necessary for efficiency:
-ex-ante capital buffers: avoid smaller crises, always on during good times -ex-post capital relief: mitigate larger crises, persistent increase in future rents, slower recovery
